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IMMUNITY INCONSISTENCY AT THE PATENT AND TRADEMARK 
OFFICE: A CASE STUDY FOR SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN 
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATIONS 
Michelle Bone* 
INTRODUCTION 
Sovereign entities, such as states, foreign countries, and Native American 
tribes, are able to assert, as a defense in civil suits, sovereign immunity, 
stemming from a traditional understanding that sovereign entities should not 
be sued by citizens and other private entities, foreign or domestic.1  However, 
the law places limitations on when sovereign immunity may be asserted,2 
when it can be abrogated,3 and when it has been waived.4  In United States 
sovereign immunity doctrine, various types of entities are treated differently, 
stemming in part from their foundations in different forms of the law; state 
sovereign immunity stems from the Constitution,5 while tribal sovereign 
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 1 See John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1889, 1896–99 (1983) (explaining the history of sovereign immunity in the United States, 
which stemmed from British conceptions of sovereign immunity of the monarch). 
 2 See, e.g., Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890) (“That a state cannot be sued by a citizen of 
another State, or of a foreign state, on the mere ground that the case is one arising under the 
Constitution or laws of the United States, is clearly established by the decisions of this court . . . .”). 
 3 See, e.g., Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 635–36 
(1999) (holding that Congress could only abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
 4 See, e.g., Gunter v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 200 U.S. 273, 284 (1906) (“[W]here a state voluntarily 
becomes a party to a cause, and submits its rights for judicial determination, it will be bound 
thereby, and cannot escape the result of its own voluntary act by invoking the prohibitions of the 
Eleventh Amendment.”). 
 5 See U.S. CONST. amend XI (“The Judicial Power of the United States shall not be construed to 
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by 
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”); Hans, 134 U.S. at 10–
11, 15–16 (holding that the Eleventh Amendment extended sovereign immunity to include suits 
brought by citizens of a state against that state). 
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immunity has its foundations in international law and the early relationship 
of British colonists with Indian tribes.6 
As the United States has grown and developed, so have sovereign 
immunity doctrines.  The clearest example of this co-evolution is 
administrative adjudication.  Though the Constitution, the Founders, and 
early Supreme Court Justices could not have foreseen the growth of the 
administrative state and the adjudications that occur in administrative 
agencies,7 the federal courts and agencies have had to grapple with sovereign 
immunity, as both states and tribes have sought to assert their immunity in 
agency adjudication.8  While the Supreme Court has provided a rule for 
when state sovereign immunity should apply in administrative 
adjudications,9 it has not yet done so for tribal sovereign immunity, leading 
to inconsistencies across courts and agencies as to whether tribal immunity 
should apply. 
This inconsistency is particularly visible in the Patent and Trademark 
Office (the “PTO”) and its decision-making body, the Patent Trial and 
Appeal Board (the “PTAB” or the “Board”).  Over the course of a year, the 
PTAB decided both state and tribal sovereign immunity cases, using 
conflicting reasoning between the cases.10  This Comment will examine the 
doctrines of tribal and sovereign immunity and the way that they have been 
applied at the PTO in order to determine whether tribal sovereign immunity 
should be applied, as state sovereign immunity is, in administrative 
adjudications. 
Part I will compare the doctrines of state and tribal sovereign immunity 
in the federal courts to understand their foundations and basic principles.  It 
will also explore immunity in administrative adjudications, where the 
Supreme Court has provided guidance only for state sovereign immunity.  
 
 6 See Catherine T. Struve, Tribal Immunity and Tribal Courts, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 137, 139–40 (2004) 
(stating that the United States continued a policy of negotiating treaties with Indian tribes, treating 
the tribes as sovereign entities). 
 7 See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 755 (2002) (“The Framers, who 
envisioned a limited Federal Government, could not have anticipated the vast growth of the 
administrative state.”).  
 8 See, e.g., id. at 749 (explaining that South Carolina asserted its state sovereign immunity, filing a 
motion to dismiss a suit against it in a Federal Maritime Commission proceeding); Mylan Pharms. 
Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, No. IPR2016-00127, 2018 WL 1100950, at *1 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 
23, 2018) (per curiam) (explaining that the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe sought to assert its sovereign 
immunity in a proceeding at the Patent and Trademark Office). 
 9 See Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 535 U.S. at 756 (holding that state sovereign immunity extends to 
administrative adjudication when those proceedings are the “type of proceedings from which the 
Framers would have thought the States possessed immunity”). 
 10 Compare Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found. Inc., No. IPR2016-01274, 2017 WL 
4015009, at *17 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017) (holding that state sovereign immunity was applicable in 
a proceeding in front of the PTO), with Mylan, 2018 WL 1100950, at *15 (holding that tribal 
sovereign immunity could not be asserted as a defense in a proceeding in front of the PTO), aff’d, 
896 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
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Part II will provide a brief overview of patent remedies and the adjudicatory 
proceedings of the PTO.  Part III will examine cases where the federal courts 
have applied principles of immunity to patent cases as well as the PTAB’s 
decisions applying sovereign immunity and examine inconsistencies in those 
decisions.  Part IV will consider the policy implications for these doctrines 
and policy reasons for and against application of tribal immunity in 
administrative adjudications. 
I.  DOCTRINES OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
Sovereign immunity doctrines have been well researched and frequently 
discussed.  This Part will provide a brief history of the two doctrines at issue, 
state and tribal sovereign immunity, and a discussion of the relevant law for 
the doctrines. 
A.  State Immunity 
State sovereignty and immunity was recognized before the Constitutional 
Convention.11  State sovereignty was debated prior to the ratification of the 
Constitution as well, as seen in Alexander Hamilton’s statement that “[i]t is 
inherent in the nature of sovereignty, not to be amenable to the suit of an 
individual without its consent.”12  Given this view of sovereignty, it is 
unsurprising that the Constitution contains no provisions about state 
sovereign immunity, though the Constitution contemplated a possibility of 
such immunity,13 as Article III grants the federal courts jurisdiction over 
“[c]ontroversies between two or more States.”14  Prior to the ratification of 
the Eleventh Amendment, the Court considered the question of state 
immunity in Chisholm v. Georgia.15  The Court, with each Justice writing a 
separate opinion, concluded that a State was not immune from suit, with 
three Justices relying on the Constitution’s grant of judicial power in Article 
III to support their opinions.16  The Court’s opinion resulted in an adverse 
 
 11 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999) (“[T]he States’ immunity from suit is a fundamental 
aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and 
which they retain today . . . except as altered by the plan of the Convention or certain constitutional 
Amendments.”). 
 12 THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton) (“Unless therefore, there is a surrender of this 
immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain with the states . . . .”). 
 13 RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 905 (7th ed. 2015). 
 14 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 15 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 420 (1793). 
 16 Id. at 450 (opinion of Blair, J.) (“What then do we find there [in the Constitution] requiring the 
submission of individual States to the judicial authority of the United States?  This is expressly 
extended, among other things, to controversies between a State and citizens of another State.”); id. 
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reaction, leading to the Eleventh Amendment.17 
The Eleventh Amendment provides that a suit in equity cannot be 
commenced against one of the states by citizens of another state or by citizens 
of a foreign state.18  Initially, the Supreme Court interpreted the amendment 
narrowly.19  However, the Supreme Court broadened its interpretation at 
the end of the nineteenth century in Hans v. Louisiana.20  In Hans, the Court 
held that the Eleventh Amendment extended to include suits brought against 
one of the states by citizens of that state, despite the amendment’s failure to 
include such language.21  Since Hans, the Court has justified state sovereign 
immunity through theories of federalism and state dignity.  The states 
entered the “federal system with their sovereignty intact,”22 rather than 
“consent[ing] to become mere appendages of the Federal Government.”23  
Thus, state sovereign immunity is a balance between state and federal rights.  
The Court has also stated that one of the purposes of “state sovereign 
immunity is to accord States the dignity that is consistent with their status as 
sovereign entities.”24 
After Hans, the Court has primarily focused on two exceptions to state 
sovereign immunity: the states’ waiver of their immunity and congressional 
ability to abrogate state sovereign immunity.25  Both exceptions present 
narrow circumstances in which a state may not claim immunity.  For a state 
to waive immunity, the Court has required express language,26 though a state 
 
at 466–67 (opinion of Cushing, J.) (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2); id. at 479 (opinion of Jay, J.) 
(also citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2); see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall 
extend to . . . Controversies between two or more States;—between a State and Citizens of another 
State . . . .”).  
 17 FALLON, supra note 13, at 906. 
 18 U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 19 See e.g., Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 738, 857–58 (1824) (holding that 
for the Eleventh Amendment to apply, a state must be a named as a party in the suit); Cohens v. 
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 410, 412 (1821) (concluding that Virginia could not assert 
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment because a petition for a writ of error was not a suit 
because a writ of error acts only on the record, not the parties, and that even if it were a suit, the 
Eleventh Amendment could not apply because the case was between a state and a citizen of the 
same state). 
 20 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
 21 Id. at 10–11, 16.  Hans argued that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar his suit against Louisiana 
because he was a citizen of Louisiana and the amendment only prevented suits brought by citizens 
of a different state or of a foreign state.  Id. at 10.  The Court held that to allow suits between a state 
and its own citizens would be inconsistent with the ultimate sovereignty the amendment created.  Id. 
at 11.  As a result, the Court concluded that a state could not be sued without its consent.  Id. at 16. 
 22 Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991). 
 23 Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 751 (2002). 
 24 Id. at 760 (citing In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887)). 
 25 Tejas N. Narechania, Note, An Offensive Weapon?: An Empirical Analysis of the “Sword” of State Sovereign 
Immunity in State-Owned Patents, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1574, 1579–80 (2010). 
 26 Id. at 1580 (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974)). 
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may also waive its immunity through litigation conduct by voluntarily 
becoming party to a suit.27  In Lapides v. Board of Regents of University System of 
Georgia,28 the Court considered when litigation conduct would amount to 
waiver of a state’s immunity.  The Court held that Georgia voluntarily 
agreed to remove its case to federal court, and therefore voluntarily invoked 
the federal court’s jurisdiction in a way that was analogous to a state 
voluntarily appearing in court, as in Clark v. Barnard and Gunter v. Atlantic Coast 
Line Railroad Co.29  Thus, any time that a state voluntarily invokes the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts, it has waived its immunity, regardless of the 
state’s motives for doing so.30 
The Court has similarly required an unmistakably clear, express 
statement of Congress’s statutory intention to abrogate state sovereign 
immunity for a state to be subject to a federal suit.31  The Court has also 
placed additional limits on abrogation.  In Seminole Tribe v. Florida, the Court 
considered the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, passed by Congress under 
the Indian Commerce Clause of the Constitution.32  The Act gave the district 
courts jurisdiction over causes of action arising from a state’s failure to 
negotiate with an Indian tribe in good faith.33  The Court held that although 
the Constitution provided Congress complete law-making authority in 
certain areas, the Eleventh Amendment prevented Congress from 
authorizing suits between private parties and unconsenting states.34  
Congress’s Article I powers could not be used to circumvent the restrictions 
the Eleventh Amendment placed on Article III judicial powers.35  In so 
holding, the Court noted that certain provisions of the Constitution would 
allow for abrogation, in particular the Fourteenth Amendment because it 
contains prohibitions that were expressly directed at the states and gave 
Congress the power to enforce those provisions.36  
Similar to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act at issue in Seminole Tribe, 
Congress amended the patent laws in 1992 to expressly abrogate state 
 
 27 Gunter v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 200 U.S. 273, 284 (1906) (“[W]here a State voluntarily 
becomes a party to a cause and submits its rights for judicial determination, it will be bound thereby 
and cannot escape the result of its own voluntary act by invoking the prohibitions of the Eleventh 
Amendment.”); Narechania, supra note 25, at 1580–81. 
 28 535 U.S. 613 (2002). 
 29 Lapides, 535 U.S. at 619–20 (citing Gunter, 200 U.S. at 284; Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 
(1883)). 
 30 Id. at 620–21. 
 31 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55–57 (1996). 
 32 Id. at 47 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).  
 33 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497, §11, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988) (codified as 
25 U.S.C. § 2710 (d)(7)(A)-(B) (2012)). 
 34 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72–73. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. at 59 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 453 (1976)). 
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sovereign immunity from patent infringement claims in the Patent and Plant 
Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act.37  In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary 
Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, the Court applied the framework 
from Seminole Tribe, determining first whether Congress clearly expressed its 
intent to abrogate state immunity and second whether abrogation was a valid 
exercise of power.38  Though the Court found that Congress had clearly 
expressed its intent to abrogate immunity, the Court maintained that Article 
I did not grant Congress authority to abrogate immunity and that such 
authority would have to be found in the Fourteenth Amendment.39  For the 
Fourteenth Amendment to support a valid abrogation, Congress was 
required to identify a transgression of the Fourteenth Amendment and then 
narrowly tailor legislation to that transgression, as asserted in City of Boerne v. 
Flores.40  The Court found that the Patent Remedy Act could not be sustained 
under the Fourteenth Amendment because there was an insufficient 
legislative history to support a finding that Congress was attempting to 
remedy a Fourteenth Amendment violation through the Act.41  
The Court has also extended the doctrine of state sovereign immunity to 
administrative adjudication proceedings.  The Court first considered the 
question of whether state sovereign immunity should apply in administrative 
adjudications in Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports 
Authority.42  While the Court recognized that the Eleventh Amendment did 
not specifically grant immunity from adjudicative proceedings, it recognized 
that their past precedents demonstrate that the Eleventh Amendment did not 
define the full scope of state sovereign immunity.43  Therefore, to determine 
whether state sovereign immunity should apply in an administrative 
adjudication, the Court looked at the administrative hearing and whether it 
was the type of proceeding in which the Framers would have thought state 
 
 37 Brandon White, Comment, Protecting Patent Owners from Infringement By the States: Will the Intellectual 
Property Rights Restoration Act of 1999 Finally Satisfy the Court?, 35 AKRON L. REV. 531, 543 (2002); see 
also Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-560, 106 Stat. 
4230, § 2 (1992) (codified as amended in 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012)) (stating that any state is subject to 
the provisions of Title 35 to the same extent as a nongovernmental entity). 
 38 527 U.S. 627, 635 (1999). 
 39 Id. at 635–36.  Congress attempted to justify the Patent Remedy Act under the Intellectual Property 
Clause, Commerce Clause, and section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, though the Court held 
that only the Fourteenth Amendment could support such an abrogation of state immunity.  Id. 
(citing U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts . . . .”); 
U.S. CONST. art I, § 8 cl. 3 (“To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several 
States . . . .”); U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 5 (granting Congress power to enforce the provisions of 
the Fourteenth Amendment)). 
 40 Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 639–40 (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 525 (1997)). 
 41 Id. at 640, 642. 
 42 535 U.S. 743 (2002). 
 43 Id. at 753. 
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sovereign immunity should apply.44  The Court concluded that 
administrative hearings at the Federal Maritime Commission bore “a 
remarkably strong resemblance to civil litigation in federal courts,” and, thus, 
were the type of proceedings in which state sovereign immunity should 
apply.45 
B.  Tribal Immunity 
While the Supreme Court has yet to make a determination of whether 
tribal sovereign immunity should apply in administrative adjudications, it is 
important to understand the state of tribal immunity doctrine that will inform 
the issue.  Unlike state sovereign immunity and modern foreign sovereign 
immunity, tribal sovereign immunity is not a constitutional or statutory grant 
but is “recognized as a matter of federal common law.”46  The doctrine of 
tribal sovereign immunity, however, does share common origins with state 
and foreign sovereign immunities.47  In part, this common origin is a function 
of the United States’ early interactions with tribes, both before and after 
winning independence from Great Britain.48  The Constitution grants 
Congress the authority to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and 
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”49  The United States 
continued to make treaties with the Indian tribes, with Congress itself having 
minimal involvement with the tribes, other than legislation for the purposes 
of enforcing treaties.50  
In an early set of cases, the Marshall Court considered the status of Indian 
tribes as sovereign entities.51  The Court distinguished Indian tribes from 
both the states and foreign nations in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,52 stating that 
the tribes were more like “domestic dependent nations,” which still 
maintained sovereignty, as seen in the way that tribes managed their own 
affairs and governed themselves.53  A year later in Worcester v. Georgia,54 the 
 
 44 Id. at 756.  
 45 Id. at 744, 759. 
 46 Catherine T. Struve, Sovereign Litigants: Native American Nations in Court, 55 VILL. L. REV. 929, 949 
(2010). 
 47 William Wood, It Wasn’t an Accident: The Tribal Sovereign Immunity Story, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1587, 1623 
(2013). 
 48 Id. at 1623–24.  European countries, including Great Britain, treated Indian tribes as independent 
sovereign states within the borders of their colonies.  Id. at 1623.  After declaring independence 
from Great Britain, the United States continued to enter into treaties with Indian tribes under the 
Articles of Confederation.  Id. at 1624. 
 49 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 50 Wood, supra note 47, at 1625. 
 51 Struve, supra note 6, at 140.  
 52 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). 
 53 Id. at 16–17. 
 54 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
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Court reaffirmed the sovereignty of the Indian tribes, asserting that the tribes 
retained their right to self-government and only relied on the United States 
for protection.55  The Court began to recognize the sovereign immunity of 
Indian tribes in Parks v. Ross,56 as the Court asserted that the Cherokees were 
a foreign, independent nation, and that the federal government had not 
granted the federal courts the power to decide matters relating to the 
Cherokee as a nation.57  With the foundations of tribal sovereign immunity 
established, the Court was more explicit about tribal immunity in 1919, 
though the Court did not fully discuss the doctrine at that time.58  However, 
the Court later established that Indian tribes would be immune from suit 
absent a congressional grant of authority to the federal courts.59  In doing so, 
the Court based its decision on public policy that both the United States and 
its “dependent sovereigns” should be exempt from suits that they did not 
consent to.60  The Court has additionally held that abrogation of tribal 
sovereign immunity, like abrogation of state sovereign immunity, requires an 
unequivocal expression of that purpose, though the authority to abrogate is 
not limited in the same ways that it is for state sovereign immunity.61   
The Supreme Court has continued to reaffirm a broad tribal sovereign 
immunity doctrine.62  The Court’s recent decisions, however, have expressed 
some uneasiness with the broad scope of tribal sovereign immunity, most 
notably in Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies.63  Despite 
upholding its broad scope, the Court was critical of tribal sovereign 
immunity, claiming that it developed by accident, arguing that the rationale 
behind its broad scope no longer exists, but ultimately deferring to Congress 
to limit the scope.64  In particular, the Court drew a parallel between tribal 
 
 55 Id. at 556.  The Court noted that Indian tribes were necessarily dependent on foreign nations to 
prevent intrusions into their territory, and thus, the relationship between the United States and the 
tribes was “that of a nation claiming and receiving the protection of one more powerful[,] not that 
of individuals abandoning their national character.”  Id. at 555. 
 56 52 U.S. (11 How.) 362 (1850). 
 57 Id. at 374. 
 58 Katherine J. Florey, Indian Country’s Borders: Territoriality, Immunity, and the Construction of Tribal 
Sovereignty, 51 B.C. L. REV. 595, 619 (2010) (citing Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354, 358 
(1919)).  
 59 See United States v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512 (1940) (“Indian Nations are exempt 
from suit without Congressional authorization.”). 
 60 Wood, supra note 47, at 1653 (citing U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. at 512–13). 
 61 Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2031 (2014) (quoting C & L Enters., Inc. v. 
Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla., 532 U.S. 411, 418 (2001)). 
 62 See, e.g., Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 782 (1991) (stating that Indian tribes 
did not surrender the immunity when the Constitution was adopted because the tribes were not 
present at the Constitutional Convention and cannot be bound by “a convention to which they 
were not even parties.”); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978) (recognizing that 
Indian tribes have common-law immunity from suit, though it is subject to abrogation by Congress). 
 63 523 U.S. 751 (1998); Struve, supra note 6, at 153. 
 64 Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 756, 758.  Scholars contend that the Court in Kiowa mischaracterized the tribal 
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sovereign immunity and foreign sovereign immunity, noting that foreign 
sovereign immunity was initially a judicial doctrine, which Congress limited 
and defined in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act to provide more 
predictable rules.65  The Court’s criticism of tribal sovereign immunity in 
Kiowa, as William Wood argues, generally undermined the legitimacy of the 
doctrine itself.66  As a result, the lower federal courts and the state courts have 
followed suit, carving out exceptions in some cases, despite the Court’s 
statement that immunity applies unless Congress has abrogated immunity or 
unless the tribe has waived immunity.67 
C.  State Sovereign Immunity and Tribal Sovereign Immunity Compared 
Tribal sovereign immunity bears resemblance to the state sovereign 
immunity doctrine in important ways.  While tribal sovereign immunity 
arises out of the concerns that are more similar to those of foreign sovereign 
immunity, and is similarly a judicial creation,68 it bears resemblance to state 
sovereign immunity in the breadth of the doctrine and the Court’s 
formulations of rules for abrogation. 
One of the most notable aspects of state sovereign immunity is its 
connection to the Constitution, both in the grant of state sovereign immunity 
found in the Eleventh Amendment and the use of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in the Court’s abrogation doctrine.  The Court has therefore 
used the Constitution to significantly limit the instances when state sovereign 
 
sovereign immunity doctrine as developing by accident.  See Wood, supra note 47, at 1657 (“[T]he 
Court’s characterizations of the doctrine, and especially its history are incorrect.  The above analysis 
makes it abundantly clear that the doctrine did not develop by accident.”); Struve, supra note 6, at 
154 (“The Kiowa Court was inaccurate in assuming that Turner provides the earliest Supreme Court 
reference to principles of tribal sovereign immunity . . . .”). 
 65 Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 759. 
 66 Wood, supra note 47, at 1598. 
 67 Id. at 1599; see, e.g., TTEA v. Ysleta del Sur Pueblo, 181 F.3d 676, 680–81 (5th Cir. 1999) 
(distinguishing Kiowa as an action for damages and holding that tribal doctrine immunity does not 
support a dismissal of actions for declaratory or injunctive relief). 
 68 Foreign sovereign immunity does not have a basis in the Constitution, like state sovereign 
immunity, but arises out of international common law principles.  Andrea M. Seielstad, The 
Recognition and Evolution of Tribal Sovereign Immunity Under Federal Law: Legal, Historical, and Normative 
Reflections on a Fundamental Aspect of American Indian Sovereignty, 37 TULSA L. REV. 661, 675 (2002).  
Foreign sovereign immunity rested primarily on deference to the political branches of government 
through the twentieth century, changing with the policies of the State Department.  See Verlinden 
B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983) (“[T]his Court consistently has deferred 
to the decisions of the political branches—in particular, those of the Executive Branch—on whether 
to take jurisdiction over actions against foreign sovereigns and their instrumentalities.”); Ex parte 
Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588–89 (1943) (recognizing the Court’s duty to defer to the State 
Department in order to maintain relations with foreign powers).  Congress eventually codified 
foreign sovereign immunity.  See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub L. No. 94-583, 
90 Stat. 2892 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. (2012)). 
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immunity may be abrogated.69  Tribal sovereign immunity is not based in 
the Constitution, but is a judicial creation.70  As a result, the limitations on 
tribal sovereign immunity are slightly different than those of state sovereign 
immunity.  Tribal sovereign immunity, though subject to abrogation by 
Congress like state sovereign immunity, does not face the same constitutional 
limits as state sovereign immunity; valid congressional abrogation of tribal 
immunity is not limited to uses of Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment power.  
The consequence of this difference is that while there are many instances 
where sovereign immunity might apply regardless of if a party is a state or a 
tribe, there are many other scenarios when only states might be able to assert 
immunity.71 
Another distinction between state and tribal sovereign immunity is the 
justification the Court espouses when discussing them.  The Court often 
points to the dignity of the states when discussing state sovereign immunity.72  
While the Court sometimes justifies tribal sovereign immunity with 
arguments about preserving their dignity, such arguments are rarely made.73  
It is far more common for the Court to point to self-sufficiency and economic 
development as justifications of tribal sovereign immunity.74  While the 
 
 69 See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 636–37 (1999) 
(determining that Congress could only validly abrogate state sovereign immunity using its 
Fourteenth Amendment powers); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72–73 (1996) 
(holding that the Eleventh Amendment restricted the Court’s use of Article III power over states 
and that Congressional power under Article I could not be used to avoid such constitutional 
restrictions). 
 70 See Seielstad, supra note 68, at 675 (“[T]he federal judiciary and Congress have also recognized the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity with respect to . . . American Indian tribes.  Tribes . . . however, 
are not part of the constitutional design . . . .”). 
 71 For example, while Congress was unable to abrogate state immunity in the Patent Remedy Act, 
the same abrogation of tribal immunity would likely be considered valid.  Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 
630 (holding that Congress had not successfully abrogated state sovereign immunity through the 
Patent Remedy Act). 
 72 See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002) (“The preeminent 
purpose of state sovereign immunity is to accord States the dignity that is consistent with their status 
as sovereign entities.”); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 714 (1999) (stating that the federal system 
preserves the sovereignty of the states by reserving them their dignity and through concurrent 
authority over people with the federal government).; see also Peter J. Smith, States as Nations: Dignity 
in Cross-Doctrinal Perspective, 89 VA. L. REV. 1, 11 (2003) (arguing that the Court has increasingly 
relied on the dignitary interests of the states to justify expanding the state sovereign immunity 
doctrine).  Peter Smith notes that the current Court did not create the dignity rationale, but did 
choose to revive it, making the rationale increasingly central to the reasoning of its decisions.  Id. at 
24.  Smith further asserts that the Court’s recent use of the term “state dignity” has little relation to 
its historic meaning derived from the law of nations that was used to initially develop foreign 
sovereign immunity doctrine.  Id. at 107. 
 73 But see Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2042 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (determining that tribes and states cannot sue each other because allowing such suits 
would “fail to respect the dignity of Indian Tribes”). 
 74 See Okla. Tax. Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 510 
(1991) (quoting California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216 (1987)) 
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Court seems to use the language of “state dignity” less in its justifications of 
tribal, it does not make sense to limit it in that way.  The idea of “state 
dignity” first developed in relation to foreign states and the law of nations.75  
Given that the Court has considered tribes to be quasi-sovereign nations that 
are foreign to the federal and state governments of the United States,76 it 
seems that the Court in some ways considers tribes to be like foreign nations.  
In comparing the tribes to the states and to foreign nations, it is odd for the 
Court to discuss the states’ immunity in terms of “state dignity” but not the 
immunity of tribes as such.  The states and tribes are both subordinate to the 
federal government in some ways, and yet the tribes, in other ways, have 
more independence from the federal government, operating for some 
functions in ways more similar to foreign nations.77  This is all to say that 
while the Court seems to justify doctrines of sovereign immunity in different 
ways, the distinctions between the justification of the doctrines do not present 
a bright line and the justifications should apply across immunity doctrines. 
II.  PATENT VALIDITY AND INFRINGEMENT PROCEEDINGS  
Before examining the way that the PTO has applied state and tribal 
immunity, this Part will briefly discuss patent validity and infringement 
claims and how they are adjudicated at the PTO. 
A.  Traditional Avenues for Asserting Patent Validity and Infringement 
Before the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act was passed in 2011, patent 
rights were asserted primarily in the federal district courts.  This is because 
Congress has explicitly stated that the district courts have original jurisdiction 
over civil actions relating to patents and that no state court has jurisdiction 
over claims relating to patents.78  Patent cases typically require a patentee to 
sue alleging that someone has infringed her patent.  In these cases, the alleged 
infringer will usually assert a defense of noninfringement or invalidity.79  
However, declaratory relief is also sometimes available; an alleged infringer 
 
(identifying Congress’s failure to abrogate tribal immunity as promoting Indian self-government, 
including self-sufficiency and economic development).  But see Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., 
Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 758 (1998) (expressing concern that immunity may have detrimental economic 
effects for parties unfamiliar with tribal immunity, particularly in tort cases). 
 75 Smith, supra note 72, at 28–29. 
 76 Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 71 (1978). 
 77 Tribes often have their own courts and are financially independent of the United States 
government.  See Kirke Kickingbird, Striving for the Independence of Native American Tribal Courts, 36 
HUM. RTS., Winter 2009, at 16, 16–17 (describing tribal governance structure). 
 78 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2012). 
 79 35 U.S.C. § 282(b) (2012). 
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may seek a declaratory judgement that a patent is invalid.80  In order to 
invoke a declaratory judgement, though, the alleged infringer must show 
there is an actual controversy under the Declaratory Judgement Act.81  
Additionally, Congress has created a special scheme for resolving patent 
disputes that involve generic drugs that infringe patents of existing drugs.82 
In a patent case in the district court, there is a rebuttable presumption 
that the patent asserted is valid.83  As a result, a party asserting invalidity has 
the burden of proving invalidity by clear and convincing evidence.84  
Furthermore, when asserting that a patent is invalid, the alleged infringer 
may do so on the basis of any ground specified in §§ 101–103 or claim that 
the patent fails to comply with the requirements of § 112.85  These grounds 
include lack patentable subject matter (§ 101), lack of novelty, also called 
anticipation (§ 102), obviousness (§ 103), and lack of written description or 
enablement (§ 112). 
B.  Inter Partes Review 
Congress created inter partes review (“IPR”) as an alternative to federal 
court litigation of patent invalidity in 2011 as part of the Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act.  Though the initial process of obtaining a patent 
provides no opportunity for third parties to challenge its validity, IPRs allow 
for any person who is not the patent owner to challenge the patent.86  Nine 
months after a patent is issued, anyone may petition the PTO to institute an 
IPR of the patent to cancel one or more of the patent claims.87  The grounds 
on which a patent may be challenged in an IPR are more limited than in a 
district court proceeding; in an IPR, the patent may only be challenged for 
anticipation (§ 102) or obviousness (§ 103).88 
Once the PTO has been petitioned for an IPR, the Director of the PTO 
must authorize the IPR to be instituted.  The petitioner must demonstrate 
that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner will prevail on at least 
 
 80 CRAIG ALLEN NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 766 (4th ed. 2017). 
 81 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2012); NARD, supra note 80, at 766. 
 82 For a detailed explanation of this scheme, see generally ANDA LITIGATION: STRATEGIES AND 
TACTICS FOR PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT LITIGATORS (Kenneth L. Dorsney ed., 2d ed. 2016). 
 83 35 U.S.C. § 282(a). 
 84 See Microsoft Corp. v. I4I Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 95 (2011) (holding that § 282 of the Patent Act 
requires an invalidity defense to be proved by clear and convincing evidence).  
 85 35 U.S.C. § 282(b).  One of the § 112 requirements is excepted from the available defenses: a patent 
may not be declared invalid, and thus cancelled, for failure to disclose a best mode, though failure 
to disclose a best mode may be grounds for denial of an application at the PTO.  Id.; 
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012). 
 86 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2012); NARD, supra note 80, at 41–42. 
 87 35 U.S.C. § 311(c)(1). 
 88 35 U.S.C. § 311(b). 
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one of the claims challenged by the petition.89  Decisions on whether to 
institute an IPR are final and nonappealable, though a party may request a 
rehearing on the decision.90  Once instituted, a decision on validity may be 
appealed to the Federal Circuit.91   
If an IPR is instituted, the petitioner must prove to the PTAB that the 
patent claims are invalid by a preponderance of the evidence.92  This is a 
much lower burden of proof than the standard applied by the federal courts, 
which require invalidity to be proved by clear and convincing evidence due 
to the presumption of validity that the courts give to patents that have been 
granted by the PTO.93  IPR proceedings also differ from the proceedings in 
the federal courts in their discovery procedures, and previously their claim 
construction procedures.94  Once a final decision has been reached on the 
patent’s validity, the petitioner may not file a new IPR regarding any 
challenged patent claims that were raised or could have been raised during 
the review.95  The petitioner also may not assert that such a claim is invalid 
in a district court or International Trade Commission action.96  Essentially, 
the decision of the PTAB precludes the same parties from litigating invalidity 
on those claims in any other forum.97  
Since IPRs were first held in September 2012 to the end of 2017, over 
7,000 IPR petitions have been filed.98  Of those proceedings, approximately 
 
 89 35 U.S.C.  § 314(a). 
 90 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c)-(d) (2015). 
 91 35 U.S.C. §§ 141, 319. 
 92 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(d) (2015). 
 93 Adriana L. Burgy, Five Considerations Before Filing an IPR, FINNEGAN: AIA BLOG (May 1, 2013), 
https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/blogs/america-invents-act/five-considerations-before-
filing-an-ipr.html.  
 94 Until recently, in IPR proceedings, claims were “given [their] broadest reasonable construction in 
light of the specification of the patent in which [they] appear,” while district courts construed the 
claims more narrowly, sometimes consulting extrinsic evidence to construe the claim.  Phillips v. 
AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted); 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.100(b), 42.200(b).  A party in an IPR may also request that the PTAB 
construes the claims according to the district court approach if they certify that the patent will expire 
within eighteen months of the filing date of the petition.  37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b).  While courts may 
consider extrinsic evidence in claim construction, the Federal Circuit held in Phillips that intrinsic 
evidence, such as the patent specification, should be given more weight in claim construction than 
extrinsic evidence, like dictionaries.  Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323–24.  However, on October 11, 2018 
the PTO passed a final rule that changed its claim construction standard to comport with the claim 
construction that would be conducted in a federal court under the America Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. 
§ 282(b).  83 Fed. Reg. 51,342 (October 11, 2018) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42). 
 95 America Invents Act (AIA) Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE (Aug. 14, 
2014, 12:26 AM), https://www.uspto.gov/patent/laws-and-regulations/america-invents-act-
aia/america-invents-act-aia-frequently-asked#3242 (last modified Aug. 5, 2016, 11:17 PM).   
 96 Id.  
 97 The petitioner may still appeal the decision to the Federal Circuit, and the decision would have the 
same preclusive effects.  35 U.S.C. §§ 319, 329. 
 98 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRIAL STATISTICS: IPR, PGR, CBM 3 (2017), 
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twenty-four percent resulted in a final written decision, and about eighty-one 
percent of those written decisions found that some or all claims at issue in the 
proceeding were unpatentable.99  Given the high percentage of claim 
invalidation, patent owners have sought ways to immunize themselves from 
IPR.  For example, the Supreme Court recently considered a challenge to 
IPR that asserted that such proceedings were unconstitutional,100 as well as 
a challenge regarding whether the PTAB could institute some challenged 
claims but not others in an IPR.101 
III.  APPLICATIONS OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN PATENT CASES AND 
INTER PARTES REVIEW 
Sovereign immunity arguments to prevent suits for patent invalidity and 
infringement are relatively new.  As a result, some sovereign immunity 
doctrines have only recently been applied by courts to patent cases.  This 
Part will examine recent cases that have applied sovereign immunity in 
patent cases (both in federal courts and in adjudications by the PTO), and 
inconsistencies between those decisions that ought to be resolved. 
A.  State Sovereign Immunity in Patent Cases 
State sovereign immunity has been asserted in patent cases far more than 
tribal sovereign immunity.  As Florida Prepaid held, Congress’s attempt to 
abrogate state immunity for patent cases was unsuccessful, since Congress 
did not utilize a constitutional provision that could validly support 
abrogation.102  As a result, states have asserted their sovereign immunity in 
subsequent cases to avoid liability for patent infringement and other patent-
related issues.  For example, in one case, a state asserted its immunity in an 
action seeking to correct the inventorship of a patent.103  In Ali v. Carnegie 
Institution of Washington, a graduate student sued both a private institute and 
the University of Massachusetts, which as a state university, asserted state 
sovereign immunity.104  The Federal Circuit held that the University of 
Massachusetts was immune from the suit, since the state never waived its 
immunity, and therefore found that the suit had to be dismissed under Rule 
 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Trial_Statistics_2017-12-31.pdf.  
 99 Id. at 11. 
 100 Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1372 (2018) 
(analyzing whether IPR violates Article III or the Seventh Amendment). 
 101 SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1352–53 (2018) (holding that the PTAB must issue a final 
decision regarding the patentability of any patent claim challenged by the petitioner). 
 102 Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 639–40, 642 
(1999). 
 103 Ali v. Carnegie Inst. of Wash., 684 F. App’x 985 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (per curium). 
 104 Id. at 986–87, 992. 
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19(b).105 
State sovereign immunity has also been asserted in administrative 
proceedings in front of the PTO.  In Vas-Cath,106 the University of Missouri 
initiated an interference proceeding107 under 35 U.S.C. § 135 at the PTO to 
determine whether their patent or that of Vas-Cath had priority.108  The 
University of Missouri did not assert its immunity at the PTO, nor could it, 
given that by initiating the interference, the University clearly consented to 
the proceeding.  However, after the PTO granted the University priority, 
Vas-Cath appealed the decision to the district courts.109  At that point, the 
University asserted its Eleventh Amendment immunity.110  As the Federal 
Circuit considered whether the University of Missouri waived its sovereign 
immunity, it looked to Lapides, as well as its own precedent.111  Although the 
Federal Circuit found that interference proceedings had strong similarities to 
civil litigation, so under Federal Maritime Commission state immunity would 
apply, it ultimately determined that because the University requested the 
interference, it had waived its immunity.112  
The PTO has also considered questions of state sovereign immunity in 
IPR proceedings.  In Covidien,113 after an IPR was instituted by the PTO, the 
University of Florida filed a motion to dismiss based on its sovereign 
immunity.114  First, the PTAB considered whether Federal Maritime Commission 
should apply in IPR proceedings.115  In doing so, the PTAB addressed 
arguments by the petitioner that Federal Maritime Commission should not apply 
because IPRs are directed at the patent itself, not the parties to the 
proceeding and because traditional remedies of injunctive relief and damages 
 
 105 Id. at 992–994; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b). 
 106 Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 473 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 107 Interference proceedings were administrative adjudications used to determine if a patent 
application should have priority over another patent or application within the meaning of 
35 U.S.C. § 102(g) before the America Invents Act was passed.  MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING 
PROCEDURE § 2301 (9th ed. 2017).  Since the America Invents Act changed the United States to a 
first to file system, interference proceedings and priority contests do not apply to patents filed after 
the effective date of the America Invents Act.   
 108 Vas-Cath, 473 F.3d at 1378. 
 109 Id. at 1379.  The case was initially appealed to the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia.  Id.  It was transferred to the Western District of Missouri pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) on a motion by the University.  Id. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. at 1381–82 (citing Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613 (2002); then 
citing Regents of the Univ. of N.M. v. Knight, 321 F.3d 1111, 1126 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that 
when a state files a suit, thereby invoking the jurisdiction of the federal courts, it waives its immunity 
not just for its own claim, but also ay compulsory counterclaims that arose out of the same conduct)). 
 112 Id. at 1382–83 (citing Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002)). 
 113 Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found., Inc., IPR2016-01274, IPR2016-01275, IPR2016-
01276, 2017 WL 4015009 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017). 
 114 Id. at *1. 
 115 Id. at *5. 
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are unavailable in IPRs.116  However, the PTAB determined that both of 
these arguments were without merit.117  The PTAB first observed that “inter 
partes” translates to “between the parties,” and further determined that 
because the patent owner had to be served with the petition, the proceeding 
was directed toward the parties themselves, not just the patent.118  
Additionally, the PTAB noted that sovereign immunity applied regardless of 
the relief a plaintiff (or petitioner) sought; the fact that the only remedy 
available in an IPR proceeding was cancellation of the patent was not a bar 
to sovereign immunity being asserted.119 
After determining that Federal Maritime Commission should be applied, the 
PTAB considered the similarities between civil litigation and the proceedings 
in an IPR.120  In particular, the PTAB identified discovery, an ability to 
submit additional briefing, and the similarities between Article III judges and 
the administrative patent judges that preside over IPRs as making IPRs 
similar to civil litigation.121  The PTAB also recognized that its ruling in this 
case would mean that all state entities would be able to claim Eleventh 
Amendment immunity from IPR proceedings, but the PTAB believed that 
the decision was consistent with the goals of state sovereign immunity in 
maintaining the dignity of the states.122 
B.  Tribal Sovereign Immunity in Patent Cases 
Similar to state sovereign immunity, tribal sovereign immunity has been 
asserted in patent cases.  In a few cases, tribes have successfully asserted a 
defense of tribal immunity in patent infringement cases.123  Congress has not 
abrogated tribal sovereign immunity in patent cases, so the courts are 
hesitant to find that tribal immunity should not apply in such cases.124  More 
 
 116 Id. at *6. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. (quoting Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 765 (2002)).  
 120 Id. at *8. 
 121 Id. at *9–10. 
 122 Id. at *11. 
 123 See Microlog Corp. v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., No. 6:10-CV-260, 2011 WL 13141413, at *2 (E.D. Tex. 
Jul. 22, 2011) (“The Patent Act, though authorizing civil actions for infringement, does not 
unequivocally abrogate an Indian Tribe’s immunity from suit for patent infringement.”); Specialty 
House of Creation, Inc. v. Quapaw Tribe, No. 10-CV-371-GKF-TLW, 2011 WL 308903, at *1 
(N.D. Okla. Jan. 27, 2011) (holding that a tribe could claim sovereign immunity in a patent 
infringement case because Congress did not expressly abrogate immunity); cf. Bassett v. 
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204 F.3d 343, 357 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding that a tribe could claim 
immunity from a copyright infringement suit). 
 124 Congress’s attempt to abrogate state sovereign immunity in the Patent Remedy Act did not also 
attempt to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity, though it is possible that Congress could take such 
action in the future. 
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recently, the Eastern District of Texas encountered an assertion of tribal 
sovereign immunity when defendants in a patent infringement case counter 
claimed that the patents in question were invalid.125  In an effort to avoid 
having its patents invalidated, plaintiff Allergan assigned its patents to the 
Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, joined the tribe to the suit in the district court, 
and the tribe asserted its immunity.126  The district court, however, decided 
that the tribe’s immunity was not applicable.127  Since the case was initially 
brought by Allergan, and the patent interest was transferred during the 
course of the litigation, the court found that the action could be continued 
against Allergan.128  As a result, the district court subsequently invalidated 
Allergan’s six patents.129   
Turning to tribal immunity in administrative proceedings, it is first 
important to note that the Supreme Court has not determined whether tribal 
immunity could apply in an adjudicative proceeding at an administrative 
agency.  The Ninth Circuit observed that tribal immunity is generally not 
asserted in administrative proceedings because tribes are not able to use their 
immunity to prevent the federal government from exercising its 
obligations.130  Furthermore, the court in that case held that “tribal 
sovereignty does not extend to prevent the federal government from 
exercising its superior sovereign powers.”131  While the Ninth Circuit held 
that the tribe’s immunity did not extend to a federal administrative 
proceeding, the court also determined that the tribe’s voluntary participation 
in that hearing did not waive its immunity in an action seeking review of the 
 
 125 Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1455-WCB, 2017 WL 4619790, at *1 (E.D. 
Tex. Oct. 16, 2017). 
 126 Adam Davidson, Why is Allergan Partnering with the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe?, NEW YORKER (Nov. 20, 
2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/11/20/why-is-allergan-partnering-with-the-
st-regis-mohawk-tribe; Jonathan D. Rockoff, Patents Take Refuge With Indian Tribe, WALL ST. J., Sep. 
9, 2017, at B.1; see also Plaintiff’s Production of Documents in Response to Court’s October 6, 2017 
Order at 510-1, Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-01455-WCB (E.D. Tex. Oct. 
10, 217) (transferring ownership of patents from Allergan to the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe). 
 127 Allergan, 2017 WL 4619790, at * 4. 
 128 Id. at *4–5.  The court further noted that its decision to order the tribe to be joined in the suit had 
no bearing on the validity of the patents or the assignment of those patents.  Id. at *5.  The court 
additionally expressed misgivings about the validity of the transfer before stating that it will join the 
tribe as a plaintiff to avoid any challenge on that ground.  Id. 
 129 Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1455-WCB, 2017 WL 4803941, at *65 
(E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2017).  The case is currently on appeal to the Federal Circuit.  See Allergan, 
Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., No. 18-1130 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 1, 2017). 
 130 Quileute Indian Tribe v. Babbitt, 18 F.3d 1456, 1459 (9th Cir. 1994).   
 131 Id.  It should be noted that Quileute Indian Tribe involves an administrative proceeding in front of the 
Interior Board of Indian Appeals, which has jurisdiction over appeals involving Indian matters.  
About the Interior Board of Indian Appeals, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, 
https://www.doi.gov/oha/organization/ibia (last visited Oct. 31, 2018).  What the Ninth Circuit 
terms as superior sovereign powers likely do not relate to all administrative agencies of the federal 
government, but instead likely apply to those that exercise direct control over Indian affairs.   
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administrative decision.132 
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion and reasoning was considered in a recent 
IPR case that addressed tribal immunity in PTO proceedings.133  The 
defendants in Allergan’s Eastern District of Texas case filed petitions for IPRs 
on the same six patents at issue in the district court, before a decision was 
rendered in that case.134  Once again, the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe asserted 
its tribal immunity in an effort to stop the invalidation of the patents.135  
Unlike the district court, which did not discuss whether tribal sovereign 
immunity should apply, the PTAB fully examined whether or not tribal 
immunity should apply in IPR proceedings.  First, the PTAB noted that, 
unlike for state sovereign immunity, there was no federal court precedent 
that suggested that Federal Maritime Commission should apply not just to state 
sovereign immunity, but also to tribal immunity in federal administrative 
proceedings.136  The PTAB additionally refused to follow the example of 
other agencies that have chosen to recognize tribal sovereign immunity in 
adjudications,137 and noting that tribal immunity does not always follow the 
same contours of state immunity.138  The Board further noted that its own 
precedent “cautions against the application of non-statutory defenses in inter 
partes review proceedings.”139 
The Board in Mylan then considered the nature of IPR proceedings to 
determine whether tribal immunity should apply.  First, the Board asserted 
that IPR proceedings were not just a forum for dispute resolutions, but were 
directed towards the patent and its validity.140  Furthermore, the PTAB 
asserted that a patent owner is not required to participate in an IPR 
proceeding, and the PTAB is able to make determinations on the validity of 
the patent regardless of if the patent owner chooses to participate.141  The 
Board also found that IPR proceedings were not the type of suit that Native 
American tribes would enjoy immunity from because the Board does not 
 
 132 Quileute Indian Tribe, 18 F.3d at 1460.  
 133 Mylan Pharms. Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, No. IPR2016-00127, 2018 WL 1100950, at *5 
(P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018) (per curiam). 
 134 Decision of Inst. of Inter Partes Review, Mylan Pharms. Inc. v. Allergan, Inc., IPR2016-01127 
(P.T.A.B. Dec. 8, 2016) 
 135 Patent Owner’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction Based on Tribal Sovereign Immunity, 
Mylan Pharms. Inc. v. Allergan, Inc., IPR2016-01127 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 22, 2017), available at 
https://s3-us-west-1.amazonaws.com/ptab-filings%2FIPR2016-01127%2F78. 
 136 Mylan,  2018 WL 1100950, at *3.   
 137 Id.; see, e.g., Kanj v. Viejas Band of Kumeyaay Indians, No. 06-074, 2007 WL 1266963, at *2–3 
(Dep’t of Labor Adm. Rev. Bd. Apr. 27 2007) (holding that existing sovereign immunity doctrine 
did not preclude sovereign immunity in administrative adjudications). 
 138 Mylan, 2018 WL 1100950, at *5 (quoting Quileute Indian Tribe v. Babbit, 18 F.3d 1456, 1459 (9th 
Cir. 1994)). 
 139 Id. at *4. 
 140 Id. at *4, *6. 
 141 Id. at *6. 
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adjudicate claims in which any relief may be sought from the tribe.142  The 
PTAB is only able to hold a patent invalid and cancel it, but it is not able to 
restrain a patent holder from acting or compel monetary damages, both of 
which could be available remedies in a federal court proceeding.143 
The Federal Circuit heard the same case on appeal from the PTAB, 
affirming the decision.144  However, unlike the PTAB, the Federal Circuit 
did not consider whether or not Federal Maritime Commission ought to apply to 
tribal immunity in administrative adjudications; rather the Federal Circuit 
applied Federal Maritime Commission, merely stating that while tribal immunity 
and state immunity were not the same, the case was nonetheless instructive 
for their analysis.145  The Federal Circuit then affirmed the PTAB’s decision 
by finding that IPRs were not sufficiently similar to civil litigation due to the 
PTO Director’s discretion at the outset of IPR proceedings, the ability of the 
PTO to continue proceedings without the parties, and the fact that the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply in IPR proceedings.146   
C.  The PTAB’s Inconsistent Reasoning 
In its decision in Mylan, the PTAB directly contradicts its own prior 
reasoning and assertions from Covidien, despite the two cases being decided 
less than a year apart.  First, the Board changed its position regarding 
whether IPR proceedings were directed towards the patent or the parties 
between the two cases.  While in Covidien the Board made clear that the 
proceedings were directed towards the parties,147 in Mylan, the Board asserts 
that the proceedings are directed at the patent, intending to correct the 
PTO’s own mistakes in granting invalid patents.148  Additionally, in Mylan, 
the Board found that since IPR proceedings did not provide ordinary 
injunctive relief or damages, they were not the type of suit in which immunity 
could be asserted.149  Conversely, in Covidien, the Board noted that sovereign 
immunity applied regardless of the relief sought.150  Furthermore, the Board 
noted that its precedent warns against applying non-statutory defenses in IPR 
proceedings as justification for not allowing a defense of sovereign immunity 
in Mylan, while allowing state sovereign immunity as a defense in Covidien.151 
 
 142 Id.  
 143 Id.  
 144 Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 896 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 145 Id. at 1326. 
 146 Id. at 1327–28. 
 147 See supra text accompanying notes 116–18. 
 148 Mylan, 2018 WL 1100950, at *4.  
 149 See supra text accompanying notes 142–43. 
 150 See supra text accompanying note 119. 
 151 See Mylan, 2018 WL 1100950, at *4 (“Board precedent cautions against the application of non-
statutory defenses in inter partes review proceedings.” (citing Athena Automation Ltd. v. Husky 
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The PTAB attempts to explain these differences by asserting that patents 
are governed by a statute of general applicability.152  While the Supreme 
Court has found that general statutes apply to all persons, including Native 
Americans and their property interests,153 it is unclear whether that includes 
only individuals or also the tribes as a whole, and the circuits are split on how 
they apply that law.154  Furthermore, when applying patent and copyright 
laws, both of which are laws of general applicability stemming from the same 
clause of the Constitution,155 the federal courts have typically allowed tribes 
to assert their sovereign immunity.156   
The Board further argues that tribal immunity and state immunity are 
not co-extensive.157  While the Board is correct that tribal immunity is not 
always co-extensive with state immunity,158 in the context of patents, tribes 
have been able to assert their immunity just as states are able to assert their 
immunity.  Beyond just patents, the Supreme Court’s precedent contains 
analogs between state and tribal sovereign immunity that suggest Federal 
 
Injection Molding Sys. Ltd., No. IPR2013–00290, 2013 WL 8595976, at  *6–7 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 25, 
2013))).  The PTAB argues that unlike the statute creating International Trade Commission patent 
proceedings, the statute creating IPR proceedings does not explicitly allow all legal and equitable 
defenses.  Id. 
 152 Id.  
 153 See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 116 (1960) (“[I]t is now well 
settled by many decisions of this Court that a general statute in terms applying to all persons 
includes Indians and their property interests.”).  In Tuscarora Indian Nation, the Court determined 
that the Federal Power Act applied to Indian nations because it specifically included “‘tribal lands 
embraced within Indian reservations.’”  Id. at 118 (citation omitted).  However, the patent statute, 
while it includes states in its definition of “whoever,” does not explicitly include tribes.  See 
35 U.S.C. § 271(h) (2012). 
 154 See Eagle H. Robinson, Comment, Infringing Sovereignty: Should Federal Courts Protect Patents and 
Copyrights from Tribal Infringement?, 32 AM. INDIAN. L. REV. 233, 242, 244 (2007) (“It is thus difficult 
to argue that the Court [in Tuscarora] did not intend the language to implicate the coffers of tribes 
as well as individuals.”). 
 155 Copyright and patent law are grounded in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 156 See Basset v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204 F.3d 343, 357 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that a tribe 
was immune from a suit asserting copyright infringement); Home Bingo Network v. Multimedia 
Games, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-0608, 2005 WL 2098056, at *1–2 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2005) (granting 
a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the defendant tribe was immune from a patent infringement 
action).  But see Robinson, supra note 154, at 248 (criticizing federal courts for allowing tribal 
immunity for patent and copyright cases despite the fact that Congress “created a system of 
intellectual property rights and protections and has made clear through several clarification acts that 
it is to apply uniformly to all.”). 
 157 See Mylan, WL 1100950, at *4 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018) (per curiam) (citing Kiowa Tribe of Okla. 
v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 756 (1998)) (recognizing precedent finding Indian tribes’ 
immunity to be nonconcurrent from the States’). 
 158 See Kiowa, 523 U.S. 751, 756 (1998) (“[T]he immunity possessed by Indian Tribes is not coextensive 
with that of the States.”); Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng’g, 476 
U.S. 877, 890 (1986) (“[B]ecause of the peculiar ‘quasi-sovereign’ status of the Indian tribes, the 
Tribe’s immunity is not congruent with that which the Federal Government, or the States, enjoy.” 
(citing United States v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 513 (1940))). 
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Maritime Commission should be extended to allow tribal immunity in 
administrative adjudications.  The Court in Federal Maritime Commission 
examines the nature of the states’ sovereign immunity, concluding that the 
states ratified the Constitution “with their sovereignty intact.”159  The Court’s 
reasoning in Blatchford suggests that the same might be said of tribal 
sovereignty, as the Court noted that the tribes could not have surrendered 
their sovereignty in a convention that they were not even parties to.160 
Next, the Federal Maritime Commission Court notes that the Eleventh 
Amendment does not define the full scope of state sovereign immunity, and 
therefore concludes that the full scope of state immunity is not described in 
the Constitution.161  The consequence of this is that the Court is willing to 
find immunity in instances that could not have been imagined or anticipated 
by the Framers of the Constitution and the Eleventh Amendment, including 
the administrative state.162  Therefore, the Court turns to the question of 
whether administrative proceedings are the type that the Framers would 
have thought the states would be immune to.163  The Court has similarly 
declined to define the full scope of tribal sovereign immunity, even refusing 
to limit immunity to activities on Indian reservations.164  The Court, rather, 
maintains that as a matter of federal law, “an Indian tribe is subject to suit 
only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its 
immunity.”165  Much like how the Federal Maritime Commission Court was faced 
with the question of whether administrative proceedings are the type of 
proceeding that the Framers imagined states would have immunity from,166 
the question here is whether an administrative proceeding is a suit.  A suit is 
defined as “[a]ny proceeding by a party or parties against another in a court 
of law.”167  Further, a court of law is considered any judicial tribunal 
administering laws, and is not limited to just an Article III court.168  Given 
this understanding of suit, the term could encompass tribunals and 
adjudications of administrative agencies. 
 
 
 159 Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 751 (2002) (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted). 
 160 Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 782 (1991). 
 161 Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 535 U.S. at 753. 
 162 Id. at 754. 
 163 Id. at 755. 
 164 Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754–55 (1998). 
 165 Id. at 754. 
 166 Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 535 U.S. at 756. 
 167 Suit, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“[S]uit refers to an ongoing dispute at any stage, 
from the initial filing to the ultimate resolution.  Lawsuit more clearly implies courtroom proceedings 
before a judge as opposed to a dispute before some other type of tribunal.” (citing BRYAN A. 
GARNER, GARNER’S DICTIONARY OF LEGAL USAGE 862–63 (3d ed. 2011))). 
 168 Court of law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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Finally, the Federal Maritime Commission Court considered Seminole Tribe 
and its holding that Congress cannot use its Article I power to abrogate state 
sovereign immunity in Article III courts.169  Extending its Seminole Tribe 
holding, the Court concluded that Congress may not use its Article I powers 
to create non-Article III tribunals that closely resemble federal courts where 
state sovereign immunity does not apply.170  In tribal immunity doctrine, the 
same limits are not placed on Congressional abrogation of immunity.  As a 
result, the Court would likely allow Congress to abrogate tribal sovereign 
immunity in an administrative proceeding.  However, that abrogation would 
have to be explicit and clear, as the law requires for any abrogation of tribal 
sovereign immunity.171   
The Federal Circuit could potentially also engage in inconsistent 
reasoning based on its decision in Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.  The Federal Circuit in that case noted that its opinion 
should be read narrowly as only deciding whether tribal immunity should 
apply to IPR proceedings.172  However, the opinion uses the doctrine 
established in Federal Maritime Commission, state sovereign immunity doctrine, 
to decide the case.173  Since the Federal Circuit essentially imported state 
immunity doctrine into tribal immunity, and ultimately decided tribal 
immunity should not apply, the court has set itself up to find that state 
immunity should not apply in IPR proceedings either.  Should the Federal 
Circuit in the future find that state immunity does apply, the Federal Circuit 
would, like the PTO, be using reasoning that was contradictory to and 
inconsistent with its prior precedents. 
IV.  POLICY UNDERPINNINGS OF TRIBAL IMMUNITY IN IPRS AND OTHER 
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATIONS 
While the Board’s reasoning in Mylan was inconsistent with both its prior 
decisions in state immunity cases and with federal court decisions in tribal 
immunity cases, there are clear policy rationales for why the Board 
determined the tribe should not be allowed to assert its immunity.  Mylan 
presents facts that are particularly troublesome because they demonstrate a 
pharmaceutical company’s attempt to circumvent the patent system.  
 
 169 Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 535 U.S. at 761.  
 170 Id.  
 171 Congress’s attempt to abrogate state sovereign immunity in the Patent Remedy Act did not also 
attempt to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity, though it is possible that Congress could take such 
action in the future.  For example, a bill was introduced in the Senate to abrogate tribal immunity 
in IPR proceedings.  S. 1948, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 172 Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 896 F.3d 1322, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2018).  
 173 See id. at 1326 (“Although the precise contours of tribal sovereign immunity differ from those of 
state sovereign immunity, the FMC analysis is instructive.”). 
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Allergan, the original patent holder in Mylan and in the Eastern District of 
Texas’s Allergan case, sold its patent to the Saint Regis Mohawk tribe just after 
the hearing at the district court and just before the IPR hearing was to take 
place.174  As Judge Bryson noted in his opinion in Allergan, “Allergan purports 
to have sold the patents to the Tribe, but in reality it has paid the tribe to 
allow Allergan to purchase—or perhaps more precisely, to rent—the Tribe’s 
sovereign immunity in order to defeat the pending IPR proceedings in the 
PTO.”175  Judge Bryson expressed serious concern over the legitimacy of that 
tactic, as have other commentators.176  And they are right to do so.  Allergan’s 
assignment of the patents is structured such that the Tribe paid nothing to 
take ownership of the patents, and instead is being paid millions of dollars to 
buy the patents and millions more in annual royalties from licensing the 
patents back to Allergan.177  The deal essentially looks, as Judge Bryson says, 
as if Allergan is merely renting the tribe’s immunity to avoid invalidation of 
their patents.178 
It is also possible that Allergan’s case might be considered a broader 
cautionary tale.  Allergan is the most recently publicized example where a 
private entity has attempted to avoid its legal obligations by effectively 
borrowing a tribe’s sovereign immunity.  But there are likely other instances 
where a party in a suit or administrative adjudication might seek to transfer 
assets to a tribe or otherwise utilize a tribe’s immunity to avoid liability and 
legal obligations.  Tribal corporations are typically exempt from suit, and 
another private entity could seek to create a subsidiary that was a tribal 
corporation in order to take advantage sovereign immunity in any number 
of types of cases.179 
However, determining that a tribe can never assert its immunity in a 
patent case or IPR proceeding may be going too far.  Allergan’s deal with 
the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe has provided one example where a tribe 
 
 174 Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1445-WCB, 2017 WL 4619790, at *1 (E.D. 
Tex. Oct. 16, 2017). 
 175 Id. at *2. 
 176 Id.; see, e.g., Dennis Crouch, Allergan: Creating Sovereign Immunity with Tribal Pass-Through, PATENTLY-
O (Sept. 8, 2017), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2017/09/allergan-creating-sovereign.html 
(asserting that Allergan’s transaction with the tribe might be considered a sham); Derek Lowe, 
Allergan Pulls a Fast One, SCIENCE TRANSLATIONAL MEDICINE: IN THE PIPELINE (Sept. 11, 2017), 
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pharmaceutical patent litigation). 
 177 Allergan, 2017 WL 4619790, at *1. 
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 179 Brian L. Pierson, The Precarious Sovereign Immunity of Tribal Business Corporations, FED. LAW., Apr. 2015, 
at 58, 59 (Apr. 2015), available at http://www.fedbar.org/Resources_1/Federal-Lawyer-
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Corporations.aspx?FT=.pdf. 
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might want to assert its immunity in a patent case, but it is not the only 
reason.  A tribe that invents and patents a machine on its own might also 
want to assert its immunity, in a fashion similar to that of state universities 
that generate patented inventions as a result of their research.  Under the 
PTAB’s Mylan decision, though, such tribes are precluded from asserting that 
immunity.180  In essence, Allergan’s transfer of patents to the Mohawk Tribe 
has poisoned the well for any other tribes that may obtain patents in more 
legitimate ways.  Furthermore, Judge Bryson’s opinion, as well as portions of 
the PTAB’s decision in Mylan suggest that it is possible to stop Allergan’s 
attempt to prevent the invalidation of its patents without the court having to 
even decide the question of whether the Mohawk Tribe is able to assert its 
sovereign immunity.181  The district court found that regardless of whether 
the Tribe asserted its immunity, the case could continue because the Tribe 
was not a required party and because the Tribe’s predecessor in interest 
sought affirmative relief.182  Likewise, in addition to considering the 
applicability of tribal immunity, the PTAB also determined that Allergan was 
the true owner of the patents, so the IPR could proceed without the Tribe.183  
Thus, courts and the PTO (and likely other administrative agencies, too) are 
able to discourage Allergan’s attempt to circumvent invalidation, even 
without determining that the tribe was unable to assert its immunity in patent 
and IPR proceedings, leaving sovereign immunity intact for tribes that might 
seek to assert it in disputes over more legitimately obtained patents. 
Additionally, there are reasons to believe that states and tribes should be 
treated equally in administrative adjudications where Congress has not 
abrogated tribal immunity.  The Court has consistently noted the odd 
position of tribes as quasi-sovereign entities.184  They are similar to states, but 
did not ratify the Constitution, so they are not part of the federalist system of 
the United States.185  They are foreign entities that can make treaties with 
 
 180 Mylan Pharms. Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, No. IPR2016-00127, 2018 WL 1100950, at *4 
(P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018) (per curiam). 
 181 Allergan, 2017 WL 4619790, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2017); Mylan, 2018 WL 1100950, at *7. 
 182 Allergan, 2017 WL 4619790, at *4. 
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party granted all substantial rights under the patent is considered the owner, no matter how the 
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omitted) (citing Okla. Tax Com’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla. 498 U.S. 505, 
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the United States, but they exist within the borders of the United States.  
They are independent entities, they rely on the United States for protection 
and other benefits and Congress can abrogate their rights at any time.  
However, regardless of this odd, quasi-sovereign state that tribes exist in, the 
Court has been clear that tribes are able to assert their immunity unless 
Congress expressly abrogates that immunity.186  That position is one that is 
very similar to the position of states.  A primary difference stems from 
Congress’s ability to abrogate immunity in more situations for tribal 
immunity than for state immunity, but in either form of immunity, absent 
express abrogation, immunity is assumed.   
Beyond just the doctrinal similarities of state and tribal sovereign 
immunity though, tribal dignity and independence is also at stake.  William 
Wood has suggested that the Supreme Court’s decision in Kiowa Tribe of 
Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies has created a trend where courts are 
more and more willing to disregard the Court’s assertion in the same case 
that absent express abrogation, tribal immunity may be asserted.187  The 
Court in that case refused to allow dignity to be a basis for upholding tribal 
sovereign immunity, and all but invited Congress to abrogate tribal 
immunity.  Wood argues that courts have undermined tribal immunity, 
slowly chipping away at the doctrine and misunderstanding the history of the 
doctrine.188  As the courts seek more ways to deny tribal immunity, tribes 
become more and more subordinate to the states and the federal 
government, denying them of their status as sovereign entities.  Allowing 
immunity in administrative adjudications could be a valuable tool for 
maintaining their status as sovereign entities, demonstrating that the tribes 
are not fully subordinate to the states and federal government, despite how 
some federal courts have pushed the doctrine. 
CONCLUSION 
Tribal immunity has yet to be applied extensively in administrative 
adjudications, but the PTAB’s recent decision in Mylan and the Federal 
Circuit’s affirmance create reason to be concerned.  The PTAB’s decision 
was both inconsistent with the broader doctrine of tribal immunity and with 
the Board’s own precedent, but the PTAB’s decision was also a reaction to 
Allergan’s attempt to avoid patent invalidation at any cost.  In its effort to 
curb Allergan’s circumvention of IPR proceedings, the PTAB declared that 
tribal immunity should not apply in IPR proceedings.  However, in order to 
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be more consistent with tribal immunity doctrine and with the closely related 
doctrine of state immunity, tribal immunity should apply in administrative 
adjudications, including IPR proceedings.  The concerns of the PTAB that 
an entity like Allergan might be trying to circumvent the IPR proceeding by 
asserting tribal immunity may be dealt with in other ways, such as examining 
the nature of the parties’ relationship, examining whether the tribe really has 
an interest in the case, and in the case of patents specifically, questioning 
which parties are able to assert the interest at stake.  Tribal immunity, much 
like state immunity, should apply in administrative adjudications under 
Federal Maritime Commission.  Not only would this put tribes on equal footing 
with states, but it also recognizes that without express abrogation by 
Congress, tribal immunity doctrine requires that tribes be able to assert their 
immunity in such proceedings. 
 
